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Recreational UAVs: Going Rogue with Pennsylvania’s 
Strict Products Liability Law Post-Tincher 
Lindsey E. Buckley* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early hours of January 26, 2015, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
crash-landed on the White House lawn.1 Unidentified and operating illegally, the 
downed UAV prompted a White House lockdown and Secret Service 
investigation.2 The UAV’s owner, who loaned it to a friend, was not in possession 
of the device when the accident occurred.3 He stated that his friend lost control of 
the recreational UAV and it inexplicably flew toward the White House.4 The owner 
pointed to well-documented technical problems with the DJI Phantom quadcopter, 
suggesting that a glitch in the controls led the UAV to go rogue.5 Fortunately, no 
injuries were reported. However, suppose we find ourselves instead in the open 
farmlands of central Pennsylvania. Another drone falls from the sky, except this 
time injuring a young child admiring the new technology as it flies overhead. What 
avenues of legal redress could an innocent bystander seek under Pennsylvania’s 
strict products liability law? Would she qualify as a “user” of the UAV under the 
intended user doctrine? Moreover, is this mishap a result of user error or a design 
defect? What evidence may the manufacturer proffer in a strict liability suit to 
prove user error or defend against theories of defects? 
                                                          
* J.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Class of 2016. The author would like to 
thank her family and all members of the Journal of Technology Law & Policy for their patience, helpful 
conversations, and comments. 
1 Pamela Brown & Jim Acosta, First on CNN: No charges against White House drone flyer, CNN 
(Mar. 18, 2015, 6:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/18/politics/white-house-drone-charges/. 
2 Byron Tau, Crash Near White House a Blow to Drone Lobbyists, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Jan. 26, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/01/26/crash-near-white-house-a-blow-to-
drone-lobbyists/tab/print. 
3 Jim Acosta & Cassie Spodak, Drone maker says it’s ‘highly unlikely’ White House drone 
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Is Pennsylvania prepared to answer these questions under its current strict 
products liability scheme? UAVs were among the top-selling gifts during the 2014 
holiday season.6 They can be purchased from manufacturers’ websites,7 mass 
suppliers such as Amazon,8 and hobby stores.9 Arcades even offer UAVs as 
prizes.10 With the rising popularity of UAVs and increased consumer access, the 
aforementioned questions will almost inevitably be presented in Pennsylvania 
courts over the next few years. 
On November 19, 2014, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued its 
opinion in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., where the court reversed decades of strict 
products liability case law.11 Although Tincher essentially wipes the strict products 
liability slate clean by overruling Azzarello v. Black Brothers and expressly 
declining to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts, thereby reaffirming its use of 
the Restatement (Second), the court left many questions unanswered.12 Ordinary 
citizens expect products liability law to be firmly established by 2015, especially 
regarding centuries-old products such as pipes;13 however, this is not the case. This 
Article will elucidate such issues in Pennsylvania’s current products liability 
scheme and discuss why these issues must be addressed before new technology 
outpaces the governing law. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of UAV terminology, 
technology, present and future trends in autonomy, and the anomaly of rogue 
UAVs. Part II addresses the federal regulations concerning commercial and 
recreational UAVs. Part III summarizes Pennsylvania’s strict products liability 
landscape before and after Tincher. Part IV evaluates the inherent intersections 
between UAV technology and the state of post-Tincher products liability law. Part 
V concludes that the public policy behind Pennsylvania’s strict liability doctrine 
                                                          
6 Loic Pialat, Drones Are Becoming Popular Christmas Gifts For Kids, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Dec. 22, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-in-united-states-drones-take-off-as-
christmas-gifts-2014-12. 
7 PARROT, https://us.store.parrot.com/en/. 
8 AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?node=9699105011. 
9 HORIZON HOBBY, http://www.horizonhobby.com/category/multirotor. 
10 Bobby Oliver, From pigs to Pikachu: The best boardwalk prizes you can win this summer, 
NJ.COM (June 02, 2015, 10:37 AM), http://www.nj.com/entertainment/index.ssf/2015/06/jersey_shore_ 
boardwalk_prizes_new_stuff_big_stuff.html. 
11 See Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014). 
12 Id. at 409–10. 
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survives, and the availability of advancing technology in the marketplace will 
present significant issues to Pennsylvania’s future strict products liability scheme. 
I. UAVS 
When it comes to aerial robotics, the terminology of the three categories of 
pilotless aircrafts—unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”), remotely piloted vehicles 
(“RPVs”), and drones—require further clarification.14 “Some people use the terms 
RPV and UAV interchangeably, but . . . the ‘remotely piloted vehicle’ is piloted or 
steered (controlled) from a remotely located position so an RPV is always a 
UAV.”15 On the other hand, “a radio-controlled model aircraft is used only for 
sport and must remain within the sight of the operator. The operator is usually 
limited to instructing the aircraft to climb or descend and to turn to the left or . . . 
right.”16 Thus, “a UAV, which may perform autonomous or preprogrammed 
missions, need not always be an RPV.”17 The power source, “which provides 
dynamic lift and thrust based on aerodynamics, is controlled by autonomous 
navigation or remote-control navigation . . . . Therefore, neither a rocket . . . nor a 
cruise missile . . . belong in this category.”18 As opposed to an RPV, a UAV will 
have a varying degree of automated intelligence.19 Thus, a UAV is capable of 
communicating with “its controller and . . . return payload data. If any fault occurs 
in any of the sub-systems or components, the UAV may be designed automatically 
to take corrective action and/or alert its operator.”20 In the past, RPVs and UAVs 
were grouped together and referred to as “drones” because both types are pilotless 
aircrafts controlled by radio signals.21 Today, the modern UAV developer and user 
community draws sharp distinctions between UAVs and drones.22 A drone is 
required to “fly out of sight of the operator, but has zero intelligence, merely being 
launched into a pre-programmed mission on a pre-programmed course and a return 
                                                          
14 PAUL FAHLSTROM & THOMAS GLEASON, INTRODUCTION TO UAV SYSTEMS 7 (4th ed. 2012). 
15 Id. 
16 REG AUSTIN, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: UAVS DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEPLOYMENT 3 (1st ed. 2010). 
17 FAHLSTROM & GLEASON, supra note 14. 
18 KENZO NONAMI, FARID KENDOUL, SATOSHI SUZUKI, WEI WANG & DAISUKE NAKAZAWA, 
AUTONOMOUS FLYING ROBOTS 7 (2010). 
19 AUSTIN, supra note 16. 
20 Id. 
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to base. It does not communicate and the results of the mission . . . are usually not 
obtained . . . until it is recovered at base.”23 The UAV community uses the term 
“drone” to refer only to “vehicles that have limited flexibility for accomplishing 
sophisticated missions and fly in a persistently dull, monotonous, and indifferent 
manner, such as a target drone.”24 Despite such distinctions and lack of technical 
correctness, the general public and media have adopted the term “drone” as a 
convenient and colloquial term for UAVs.25 
A UAV is a powered vehicle that does not carry a human operator, can be 
operated autonomously or remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can 
carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.26 The aircraft is just one component of the 
aggregate unmanned aircraft system (“UAS”).27 The complete system consists of 
(1) a control station that houses the operators of the system; (2) the aircraft carrying 
the payload; (3) the system of communication between the control station and the 
aircraft, which typically consists of radio transmission; and (4) support equipment 
which may include maintenance and transport items.28 
The most common UAV aircraft platforms available to consumers are fixed-
wing and rotary-wing UAVs.29 Fixed-wing UAVs are “unmanned airplanes (with 
wings) that require a runway to take-off and land, or catapult launching.”30 Rotary-
wing UAVs (or propeller-based systems), unlike fixed-wing UAVs, can fly in 
every direction and hover in fixed positions.31 The size of UAVs can range from 
that of a large insect to an aircraft weighing more than 14,950 pounds with a 
wingspan of more than 130 feet.32 UAVs carry payloads, or attachable accessories, 
                                                          
23 AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 3. 
24 FAHLSTROM & GLEASON, supra note 14. 
25 Id. 
26 Jay Gundlach, Designing Unmanned Aircraft Systems: A Comprehensive Approach, 
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS EDUCATION SERIES 2 (2012). 
27 AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 1. 
28 Id. 
29 NONAMI ET AL., supra note 18, at 9–11. 
30 Id. at 9. 
31 Press, UAV: Fixed Wing or Rotary?, SUAS NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.suasnews.com/ 
2013/09/25214/uav-fixed-wing-or-rotary/. 
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including, but not limited to, cameras, thermal imaging devices, sensors,33 laser 
radars, guns, pepper spray, and bubble machines. 
A. UAV and Operator Communication 
A UAV’s communications system provides the data uplink and downlink 
between the aircraft and the control station.34 The uplink transmits data from the 
control station to the aircraft, including flight path and control of payload,35 while 
the downlink transmits data from the aircraft to the control station, such as images, 
payload data, status information, and position information.36 The transmission 
medium is typically radio frequency.37 
Communication with external systems can be achieved using systems housed 
with the control station.38 Such communication between external systems led to one 
of the first fully autonomous, self-organized UAV flocks.39 These fully 
autonomous UAVs “navigate themselves based on the dynamic information 
received from other robots in the vicinity. [They] do not use central data processing 
or control . . . [and] the necessary computations are carried out by miniature on-
board computers.”40 
B. Autonomy 
Autonomous UAVs may be the latest consumer trend and will likely be 
hitting the navigable airspace (“NA”) soon.41 Several UAVs, such as the Zano, 
Hexo+, and AirDog, boast autonomy, surpassed their crowd funding stages, and 
will be available for pre-order.42 Autonomous robots are capable of performing 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 12–13. 
35 Id. 
36 AUSTIN, supra note 16. 
37 Id. at 12. 
38 Id. at 10. 
39 G. VÁSÁRHELYI ET AL., Outdoor flocking and formation flight with autonomous aerial robots 
(Feb. 14, 2014), available at https://hal.elte.hu/flocking/browser/trunk/public/references/vasarhelyi/ 
Vasarhelyi2014outdoor.pdf?format=raw. 
40 Id. 
41 Gannon Burgett, AirDog: The Foldable, Autonomous GoPro Drone that Always Keeps You in 
the Shot, PETAPIXEL (June 18, 2014), http://petapixel.com/2014/06/18/airdog-foldable-personal-gopro-
drone-always-keeps-view/. 
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tasks without continuous human guidance in unstructured environments.43 
Autonomy is never absolute, but rather relative to the envisioned environment in 
which the agent will interact.44 Depending upon the demands under various 
conditions in a given environment, an intelligent autonomous robot will make 
independent, competent decisions.45 Finding a consensus as to the levels of 
autonomy among the UAV community is a feat in itself; nonetheless, the following 









               46 
Within the context of UAV technology, autonomy refers to a very high level of 
automation where a number of subsequent decision branches are programmed into 
the on-board computer, thus enabling a UAV to make progressive decisions 
without reference to the operator.47 In the event that a subsystem or component 
fails, a UAV may be designed to automatically take corrective action and alert its 
operator.48 Attempts have been made to implement on-board decision-making 
                                                          
43 Nirmal Baran Hui & Dilip Kumar Pratihar, Design and Development of Intelligent Autonomous 
Robots, in STUDIES IN COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 275 INTELLIGENT AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS: 
FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 30, 30 (Dilip Kumar Pratihar & Lakhmi C. Jain eds., 2010). 
44 Wolfgang Bibel, General Aspects of Intelligent Autonomous Systems, in STUDIES IN 
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 275 INTELLIGENT AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS: FOUNDATIONS AND 
APPLICATIONS 5, 8 (Dilip Kumar Pratihar & Lakhmi C. Jain eds., 2010). 
45 Dilip Kumar Pratihar & Lakhmi C. Jain, Towards Intelligent Autonomous Systems, in STUDIES 
IN COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 275 INTELLIGENT AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS: FOUNDATIONS AND 
APPLICATIONS 1, 1 (Dilip Kumar Pratihar & Lakhmi C. Jain eds., 2010). 
46 ALAN F. HILL, FIONA CAYZER & PETER R. WILKINSON, EFFECTIVE OPERATOR ENGAGEMENT 
WITH VARIABLE AUTONOMY (2007). 
47 AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 300. 
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capability using artificial intelligence in order to provide autonomy of operation.49 
Advantages of on-board automation include the reduction of operator workload, 
possible operator errors, and the use of radio bandwidth.50 Nevertheless, a fully 
autonomous UAV may not be desirable; considering its intelligence, it may refuse 
to complete a mission or exhibit undesirable behaviors to the operator.51 
C. Rogue Drones 
A simple search for “drone flyaways” on YouTube reveals footage captured 
by thousands of UAV cameras, proffering evidence that these aerial robots take on 
minds of their own and uncontrollably zip away from their operators.52 UAVs can 
go rogue for a number of reasons, including, but not limited to, software glitches, 
poor global positioning system (“GPS”) data, lost connection to controllers, and 
electromagnetic interference.53 Even tall buildings, cell phone towers, and solar 
flares can interfere with the satellite-based GPS and on-board compasses.54 UAVs 
will potentially go rogue when a user neglects to calibrate the UAV’s compass or 
configure the fail-safe functions.55 The issue of rogue UAVs is problematic not 
only for UAV operators who may lose their pricey investments, but also for UAV 
manufacturers, distributors, and the general public. The general public is a relevant 
party to this issue because it consists of individuals who will be required to 
navigate the legal landscape in order to assert or defend against claims that UAVs 
cause personal injuries to innocent civilians. 
UAVs are a relatively new technology in the marketplace. Pertinent to the 
White House UAV incident, a DJI spokesman released statements suggesting that 
had these events resulted in a products liability trial, DJI’s main defense would be 
misuse even though the company admitted that their products are prone to mishaps 
and that anomalies exist in their systems.56 This manufacturer admitted the 
                                                          
49 Id. at 299. 
50 Id. at 300. 
51 Id. 
52 Rogue Drone Cuts Ladies Arm (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
szTkg_78sF0. 
53 Jack Nicas, What Happens When Your Drone Escapes, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 8, 
2014, 7:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-happens-when-your-drone-escapes-1418086281. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Brown & Acosta, supra note 1 (“For anyone to even consider operating a personal UAV in this 
area is almost unfathomable and displays a remarkable lack of awareness . . . . We think a rogue 
‘flyaway’ scenario highly unlikely given the reported circumstances . . . . We watch for and actively 
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company works to resolve such anomalies, thus indicating that UAV technology is 
not firmly solidified and is not as safe as possible. With any new technology, there 
will, at a minimum, be anomalies. The question, however, is whether these 
anomalies are enough to give rise to a products liability claim. 
II. FEDERAL UAV GUIDANCE 
In February 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) released its 
long-anticipated Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”), which is 
specifically applicable to UAVs used for private commercial purposes.57 The notice 
and comment period for the NPRM ended on April 24, 2015.58 The provisions 
highlight the FAA’s concerns regarding the integration of commercial UAS 
operation into the NA. The proposed rules are divided into four sections: 
operational limitations, operator certification and responsibilities, aircraft 
requirements, and model aircraft.59 
The FAA’s overarching safety concern for a UAS is apparent in the proposed 
rules. The responsibilities of the UAS’ operator in regard to safety are central in 
that every section explicitly touches on the roles of the operator. For example, the 
UAS “must remain close enough to the operator for the operator to be capable of 
seeing the aircraft with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses” 
and UAS “may not operate over any persons not directly involved in the 
operation.”60 Under the “Aircraft Requirements” section, the FAA requires that an 
“operator must maintain a small UAS in condition for safe operation and prior to 
flight must inspect the UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation.”61 
The element of human control over the UAS is central to legal use of commercial 
UAS; accordingly, the FAA is indubitably unprepared to embrace purely 
autonomous UAS for commercial purposes. Nonetheless, the “Model Aircraft” 
section of the “Overview” states that the “[p]roposed rule would not apply to model 
                                                          
57 Regulations will Facilitate Integration of Small UAS into U.S. Aviation System, FEDERAL 
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 27, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/ 
news_story.cfm?newsId=18295. 
58 Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
(June 1, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.faa.gov/uas/nprm/. 
59 Overview of Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FEDERAL AVIATION 
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aircraft that satisfy all of the criteria specified in Section 336 of Public Law 112-
95.”62 
In adherence with Section 336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012 (Public Law 112-95), the FAA has promulgated guidance in the form of 
model aircraft operations limits for hobbyists, and requires that: 
(1) the aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational 
use; (2) the aircraft is operated in accordance with a 
community-based set of safety guidelines and within the 
programming of a nationwide community-based 
organization; (3) the aircraft is limited to not more than 
55 pounds unless otherwise certified through a design, 
construction, inspection, flight test, and operational 
safety program administered by a community-based 
organization; (4) the aircraft is operated in a manner that 
does not interfere with and gives way to any manned 
aircraft; (5) when flown within 5 miles of an airport, the 
operator of the aircraft provides the airport operator and 
the airport air traffic control tower . . . with prior notice 
of the operation; and (6) the aircraft is flown within 
visual line sight of the operator.63 
Hence, under the FAA, commercial use of purely autonomous UAS is prohibited, 
yet recreational use of purely autonomous UAS is feasible. 
III. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN PENNSYLVANIA 
Under negligence law, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was 
unreasonable. This burden was sometimes unattainable in cases arising from the 
use of allegedly defective products. A change in legal philosophy was inspired by 
the development of a sophisticated and complex industrial society containing new 
products and technology.64 The courts developed strict products liability law in 
order to advance the social policy of protecting product users and placing the 
                                                          
62 Id. 
63 What Can I Do With My Model Aircraft?, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/publications/model_aircraft_operators/. 
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burden on the manufacturer, distributor, and supplier—the parties most likely able 
to bear the burden.65 
A. History of Pennsylvania Strict Products Liability Law 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted § 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts in the case of Webb v. Zern in 1966.66 According to Tincher, 
§ 402A was adopted in response to the policy articulated by the concurring and 
dissenting opinions of Justices Jones and Roberts in Miller v. Preitz: 
The public interest in affording the maximum protection 
possible under the law to human life, health and safety; 
the inability of the consumer to protect himself; the 
seller’s implied assurance of the safety of a product on 
the open market; the superior ability of the manufacturer 
or seller to distribute the risk of loss . . . all support the 
extension of the protection of strict liability beyond the 
food cases to those involving other consumer goods as 
well.67 
The court embraced the concept of strict liability in tort for defective products and 
adopted the language of § 402A, thereby determining the elements for a strict 
products liability claim to be: (1) proof a product defect existed (2) at the time the 
product left the manufacturer, seller, or distributor’s control, and (3) that it was the 
cause of injury.68 Thus, the Webb decision established that any seller of a product 
would be held strictly liable for harm caused to the user or their property if the 
product is in a defective condition or is unreasonably dangerous.69 A seller will be 
held strictly liable only if he is in the business of selling such products, and the 
product is expected to reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the 
                                                          
65 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 383. 
66 Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966). 
67 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 361 (citing to Miller, 221 A.2d at 338–39). 
68 Webb, 220 A.2d at 854 (“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and; (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold . . . . (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although . . . 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and; (b) the user 
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condition in which it was sold.70 The subsequent landmark decision of Azzarello v. 
Black Brothers Co. vehemently adhered to the fundamental principles and policy 
matters inferred from the adoption of § 402A. 
1. Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co. 
In Azzarello, the plaintiff’s hand was pinched between two rubber rolls in a 
coating machine that was manufactured and sold by the defendant, Black 
Brothers.71 The plaintiff relied on the theory of strict liability under § 402A in 
bringing her claim.72 The trial court used the phrase “unreasonably dangerous”—
taken verbatim from § 402A—in charging the jury.73 This jury charge was the basis 
for the plaintiff’s appeal; the en banc court granted the motion for a new trial.74 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the consideration of 
whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable was a reversible error in a strict 
liability case.75 The Azzarello opinion established the longstanding principle that 
negligence concepts have no place in Pennsylvania strict products liability claims.76 
Additionally, whether a product was unreasonably dangerous was a question of law 
to be determined by the judge based on social policy considerations, balancing 
foreseeable risks and product utility in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.77 
Only after the judge determined whether the product was unreasonably dangerous 
could the jury decide whether the product was defective: lacking any element 
necessary to make the product safe.78 
The Azzarello court’s reasoning behind separating negligence and strict 
liability was best articulated in Phillips v. Cricket Lighters: “Strict liability focuses 
solely on the product, and is divorced from the conduct of the manufacturer . . . . 
With such a cause of action, it would be the height of illogic to introduce a test 
which examines whether the manufacturer acted with due care.”79 The Azzarello 
                                                          
70 Id. 
71 Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1022. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1023. 
75 Id. at 1027. 
76 Id. 
77 Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1026–27. 
78 Id. at 1027. 
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court determined that the use of the term “unreasonably dangerous” in jury 
instructions incorrectly indicated to the jury that the consumer had the burden of 
proving an element of negligence.80 In citing the California Supreme Court, placing 
the burden of proof of a negligence element on an injured plaintiff is unwarranted, 
and the supplier’s liability is limited “by the necessity of proving that there was a 
defect in the manufacture or design of the product, and that such defect was a 
(legal) cause of the injuries.”81 The court also relied on the notion that negligence 
and strict liability are antithetical to each other, a concept that was derived by a 
New Jersey court in Glass v. Ford Motor Co.82 
In its final remarks, the court concluded, “[T]he jury may find a defect where 
the product left the supplier’s control lacking any element necessary to make it safe 
for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended 
use.”83 Thus, in strict liability cases, juries were instructed as follows: 
The supplier of a product is the guarantor of its safety. 
The product must, therefore, be provided with every 
element necessary to make it safe for its intended use, 
and without any condition that makes it unsafe for its 
intended use. If you find that the product, at the time it 
left the defendant’s control, lacked any element 
necessary to make it safe for its intended use or 
contained any condition that made it unsafe for its 
intended use, then the product was defective, and the 
defendant is liable for all harm caused by such defect.84 
The language of this jury instruction mimicked the language used in Azzarello.85 
This jury instruction eventually led to the exclusion of evidence and defenses that 
incorporated negligence concepts—such as comparative negligence defenses, 
evidence of compliance with industry standards, and evidence of reasonable 
conduct on behalf of the manufacturer or supplier—from being presented to juries 
                                                          
80 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 367. 
81 Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1025. 
82 Id. (citing Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 304 A.2d 562, 564 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973)). 
83 Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978). 
84 PENNSYLVANIA STD. CIV. J.I. 8.02 (3d ed. 2005). 
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for consideration.86 The holding in Azzarello initiated a pattern of rulings in 
Pennsylvania case law that puzzled the masses.87 
2. The Issues That Followed Under Azzarello 
As a result of the rigorous negligence-strict liability dichotomy set forth in 
Azzarello, negligence evidence and theories were deemed inadmissible in strict 
liability cases. Inadmissible “state of the art” evidence included scientific 
unknowability, industry standards, and government standards.88 In 1985, the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided Carrecter v. Colson Equipment, holding 
that under Azzarello, manufacturers were barred from introducing evidence that 
safer means were scientifically unknowable.89 “What a defendant ‘should have 
known’ is a classic negligence inquiry which our courts have held unequivocally 
does not belong in a products liability action.”90 In 1987, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania issued its opinion in Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Division, holding 
evidence of industry customs and standards to be inadmissible in strict liability 
actions, citing Azzarello.91 The court stated that “evidence of industry standards . . . 
go to the reasonableness of the [defendant’s] conduct in making its design 
choice.”92 It concluded that such evidence of industry standards would have 
improperly brought concepts of negligence law into the case.93 Hicks v. Dana, 
decided in 2009 by the Superior Court, held that “governmental regulations are 
inadmissible in strict liability cases . . . based upon the general premise that the 
introduction of such evidence has the effect of shifting the jury’s attention from the 
existence of a defect to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct, which is 
irrelevant in strict liability actions.”94 
A significant portion of the Superior Court’s 1997 opinion in Riley v. Warren 
Mfg., Inc. focused on the intended user doctrine: the requirement that a plaintiff 
prove that he is a user or consumer of the product in order to prove a claim under 
                                                          
86 See Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 499 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. Super. 1985); Lewis v. Coffing 
Hoist Division, 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987); Estate of Hicks v. Dana Companies, LLC, 984 A.2d 943, 
965 (Pa. Super. 2009). 
87 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 376. 
88 Carrecter, 499 A.2d at 330; Lewis, 528 A.2d at 594; Dana, 984 A.2d at 965. 
89 Carrecter, 499 A.2d at 330. 
90 Id. 
91 Lewis, 528 A.2d at 594. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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§ 402A in Pennsylvania.95 This requirement is derived from the Restatement, which 
defines “user” as follows: 
“User” includes those who are passively enjoying the 
benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in 
automobiles or airplanes, as well as those who are 
utilizing it for the purpose of doing work upon it, as in 
the case of an employee of the ultimate buyer who is 
making repairs upon the automobile which he has 
purchased.96 
However, casual bystanders and passers-by that came in contact with and were 
injured by exploding products have been denied recovery.97 In 2009, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Berrier v. Symplicity Mfg., inaccurately 
predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would adopt the Restatement 
(Third) to provide for bystander recovery by permitting a cause of action in strict 
liability to all foreseeable persons affected by a defective product.98 
From 1966 to 2014, Pennsylvania’s lower courts attempted to maneuver the 
convoluted landscape of strict products liability law. Tincher gave Pennsylvania’s 
high court another opportunity to decide whether to officially adopt the 
Restatement (Third), clarify the state of bystander recovery, and examine 
evidentiary considerations in strict liability actions. 
B. Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued the landmark decision of Tincher 
in November 2014, and its holdings will inevitably change the future of 
Pennsylvania strict products liability law.99 In what has become the seminal case in 
this area of law, Chief Justice Castille penned the 137-page majority opinion that 
explicitly overruled Azzarello, clarified and established two alternative theories 
plaintiffs may use for their cause of action, and reaffirmed Pennsylvania’s use of 
the Restatement (Second).100 
                                                          
95 Riley v. Warren Mfg., Inc., 688 A.2d 221, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., 563 F.3d 38, 46–56 (3d Cir. 2009). 
99 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 328. 
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1. Overruled Azzarello 
The facts of Tincher surround a lightning strike near the Tincher family home, 
which punctured the corrugated stainless steel tubing that transported natural gas to 
their fireplace; Omega Flex manufactured and sold the tubing.101 The lightning 
strike melted the tubing and ignited the natural gas, which resulted in a fire that 
caused significant damage to the plaintiffs’ home and belongings.102 Because the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had not adopted the Restatement (Third), the trial 
court declined to charge the jury in accordance with that treatise, and the jury 
ultimately issued a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.103 Omega Flex filed a motion 
for post-trial relief, based upon the trial court’s failure to apply the Restatement 
(Third); yet the trial court denied the motion and entered a judgment on the 
verdict.104 Omega Flex appealed to the Superior Court, which agreed with the trial 
court.105 The issue allowed on appeal to Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was 
whether the court should replace the strict liability analysis of § 402A with the 
analysis of the Restatement (Third).106 
The court unanimously decided to overrule Azzarello, finding its methods to 
be “impracticable and inconsistent with the theory of strict liability.”107 Azzarello 
“articulate[d] governing legal concepts which fail to reflect the realities of strict 
liability practice and to serve the interests of justice.”108 Tincher explicitly 
disapproved of the process by which Azzarello arrived at its unfounded holdings.109 
According to Tincher, the rule established by Azzarello “is that negligence concepts 
and rhetoric—although addressed in the negative by the Restatement—somehow 
affected a plaintiff’s burden of proof in all strict liability cases, regardless of the 
                                                          
101 Id. at 336. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 340–41. 
104 Id. at 341–42. 
105 Id. at 343. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 406. 
108 Id. at 376. 
109 Id. at 377–78 (“The Court parsed the language of the Second Restatement, particularly the 
terms ‘defective condition’ and ‘unreasonably dangerous,’ for a precise meaning and the reporter’s 
intent in the utilization of those terms . . . . But, Section 402A does not articulate legal ‘requirements’ as 
a statute may; and, moreover, the ‘intent’ of the reporter is, of course, not due the same weight as a 
pronouncement of legislative intent in statutory construction. . . . The Azzarello Court seemed to engage 
in a statutory-type construction of Section 402A, including by proceeding to presume every part of 
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pertinent facts.”110 Chief Justice Castille hinted at judicial overreaching, since the 
facts of Azzarello did not necessitate the broad pronouncement that negligence-
related verbiage in jury instructions would burden a plaintiff with an additional and 
unwarranted burden of proof in every case.111 Furthermore, the Azzarello court 
made a giant logical leap in assuming that every lay jury would “relate 
reasonableness and other negligence terminology, when offered in a strict liability 
charge to a ‘heavier,’ negligence-based burden of proof.”112 The Chief Justice took 
further issue with Azzarello in that it depended not on the Restatement or any 
source of Pennsylvania law for support in its holding, but rather depended upon 
decisions of the Supreme Court of California and New Jersey’s Glass decision, 
which was ultimately rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court.113 
The jury instructions that resulted “discouraged the exercise of judicial 
discretion in charging the jury . . . and likely stunted the development of the 
common law in this area from proceeding in a more logical experience-based and 
reason-bound fashion.”114 This is because trial courts are not necessarily qualified 
in conducting the social policy inquiries into the risks and utilities of the vast array 
of products available on the market and deciding whether a product is unreasonably 
dangerous as a matter of law, as required by Azzarello.115 Accordingly, “a strict 
reading of Azzarello is undesirable because it would encourage trial courts to make 
either uninformed or unfounded decisions of social policy that then substantially 
determine the course and outcome of the trial.”116 The court went on to emphasize 
and explain the supplier’s duty to the consumer to provide a product free from a 
defective condition,117 and then illuminated the two alternative approaches under 
which a plaintiff may now prove a product defect: the consumer expectations test118 
and the risk-utility test.119 
                                                          
110 Id. at 377. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 377–78. 
114 Id. at 379. 
115 Id. at 380. 
116 Id. at 381. 
117 Id. at 383. 
118 Id. at 387. 
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2. Consumer Expectations and Risk-Utility Tests 
Plaintiffs may now show that a product is in a defective condition by proving: 
(1) the danger is unknowable and unacceptable to the average or ordinary consumer 
(i.e., consumer expectations test),120 or (2) a reasonable person would conclude that 
the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden 
or costs of taking precautions (i.e., risk-utility test).121 Under the risk-utility 
analysis, the court balances seven factors to determine whether the magnitude of 
the harm caused by the product’s condition outweigh the costs of the design.122 A 
plaintiff may also proceed using both tests to assert his cause of action.123 Thus, it 
is no longer necessary for the trial court to make a determination as to whether the 
product is “unreasonably dangerous,” and even the preliminary question of its 
defectiveness is now to be submitted to the jury.124 Juries may now use the risk-
utility analysis in deciding the defectiveness of products.125 
3. Pennsylvania Declines to Adopt the Restatement (Third) 
The justices were divided by a vote of 4-2 in declining to adopt the 
Restatement (Third) framework; it explicitly emphasized that the decision to adopt 
the Restatement (Third) belongs to the legislature.126 The Restatement (Third) is 
allegedly more defendant-friendly, since it permits the introduction of evidence that 
the defendant exercised reasonable care to make the product safe, and that a 
                                                          
120 Id. at 387. 
121 Id. 
122 (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public as a 
whole; (2) the safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable 
seriousness of the injury; (3) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need 
and not be as unsafe; (4) the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product 
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; (5) the user’s ability 
to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; (6) the user’s anticipated awareness of 
the dangers inherent in the product and their availability, because of general public knowledge of the 
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; (7) the 
feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or 
carrying liability insurance. John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. 
L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973); Tincher, 104 A.3d at 389–90. 
123 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 391. 
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plaintiff is required to prove that a reasonably safer alternative design exists in 
order to recover on a design defect claim.127 
The majority opinion is concerned with the common law.128 The American 
Law Institute consists of legal scholars who undertake the mission of reviewing 
case law and refining it into “black letter” rules depicted in its series of 
Restatements.129 The common law, however, ensures that the judiciary does not 
become encased in one single idea represented through such a treatise, and gives 
the courts power to decide issues cautiously.130 Chief Justice Castille finds the 
Restatement’s “articulation of common law principles in terms of extrapolations 
from evidence relevant in the typical case . . . problematic,”131 and essentially states 
that the judiciary cannot allow the Restatement (Third) to engulf society’s 
understanding of products liability; leeway and the freedom for lower courts to 
litigate issues is crucial to the construction of an infallible products liability 
scheme.132 
The Chief Justice emphasizes that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is 
principle-based, and his concerns with the Restatement (Third) are due to its 
evidentiary-based concepts.133 The Restatement (Third) has the potential to 
completely circumscribe cases and place consumers in harmful conditions.134 The 
Restatement (Third) may deter innovation, due to the fact that revolutionary 
products seldom have alternative designs. How do we know the existing product is 
the safest it can be? Adopting the Restatement (Third) would categorically exempt 
inventors who are not in positions to make preexisting alternative designs.135 
Where a plaintiff is filing suit against a first-time designer, the plaintiff will not be 
able to show alternative designs unless the plaintiff becomes a professional 
designer himself; otherwise, he cannot meet this stringent burden of proof.136 
                                                          
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 397. 
129 Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—the American Law 
Institute’s Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 743 (1998). 
130 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 398. 
131 Id. at 397. 
132 Id. at 399. 
133 Id. at 396–97. 
134 Id. at 394. 
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IV. THE INTERSECTION OF UAV TECHNOLOGY WITH THE CURRENT 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
A. The Negligence-Strict Liability Tango 
Tincher has left several already-loose ends untied. One of the principal effects 
of Tincher is its perceived abolishment of the separation between negligence 
concepts and strict liability.137 Under Azzarello, defendants were not permitted to 
introduce evidence that brought up issues of negligence by a plaintiff.138 While the 
court overruled Azzarello, it did not adopt the Restatement (Third), which has 
resulted in a gray area concerning what evidence is admissible under the 
Restatement (Second) approach post-Tincher and post-overruling of Azzarello. This 
uncertainty has arisen because the courts that prohibited evidence of compliance 
with industry and government standards based their decisions on Azzarello.139 With 
Azzarello and the negligence-strict liability dichotomy overruled, and evidentiary 
matters undecided by the court, defense attorneys will likely attempt to introduce 
evidence that was previously inadmissible. Such evidence includes federal 
regulatory standards, factors that designers or manufacturers rely on in developing 
their products,140 technological feasibility, comparative fault,141 and reckless 
conduct.142 This is problematic for a number of reasons. 
The typical instruction, Standard Civil Jury Instruction § 8.02, incorporates 
the description of a manufacturer’s duty based on the holdings of Azzarello by 
requiring the inclusion of every element necessary to make the product safe.143 The 
jury instruction is now porous since it contains language from an overruled case. In 
the minds of defense attorneys, “every element necessary to make the product safe” 
is a much higher burden to prove than complying with government standards and 
not necessarily supplying the product with every element to make it safe. Thus, 
                                                          
137 Id. at 378. 
138 Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1026–27. 
139 Carrecter, 499 A.2d at 330; Lewis, 528 A.2d at 594; Dana, 984 A.2d at 965. 
140 Max Mitchell, Products Liability Cases in Pa. Face an Uncertain Road, THE LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202677352885/Products-
Liability-Cases-in-Pa-Face-an-Uncertain-Road?slreturn=20150224151852. 
141 James M. Beck, ‘Tincher’ Opens Door to Previously Excluded Negligence Evidence, THE 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202716633012/ 
Tincher-Opens-Door-to-Previously-Excluded-Negligence-Evidence?rss=rss_pa. 
142 Mitchell, supra note 140. 
143 Larry E. Coben, Pennsylvania Products Liability: Instructing the Jury, PHILADELPHIA TRIAL 
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defendants will likely try to squeeze in evidence of industry standards under the 
postulation that Azzarello barred such evidence. Nonetheless, Tincher did not 
overrule the cases that barred industry and government standards from being 
introduced; Dana and Lewis are still good law.144 
In a strict products liability case involving personal injury by a recreational 
UAV, the only applicable government standard is the FAA’s NPRM. A 
manufacturer would argue that although a UAV can be smashed into walls or 
people and easily rebuilt, the UAV is not unreasonably dangerous—not for the 
aforementioned reasons—but because the manufacturer complied with the FAA 
regulations. However, the FAA’s regulations for recreational use pose no standards 
in which a UAV manufacturer could comply. The introduction of products with 
advanced technological capabilities into the mainstream marketplace will muddy 
the strict liability analysis further, especially since it is unclear whether the long-
anticipated FAA standards will offer any true guidance. 
Furthermore, Tincher declined to adopt the Restatement (Third), which 
specifically permits evidence of industry standards.145 When establishing the two 
new standards of proof for a strict liability claim, Tincher referenced its California 
sister court.146 Since the California Supreme Court held in Barker v. Lull that a 
manufacturer’s reasonableness was not a factor to consider under strict liability 
because it aligned more with the principles of negligence,147 it is arguable that 
Pennsylvania will and should follow suit. 
B. Bystander Recovery 
Equally important, Tincher declined to comment or rule regarding bystander 
recovery in Pennsylvania.148 Under the consumer expectations test, “a product is 
not defective if the ordinary consumer would reasonably anticipate and appreciate 
the dangerous condition of the product and the attendant risk of injury of which the 
plaintiff complains.”149 Because § 402A requires that the plaintiff be a user or 
consumer of the product and includes those passively enjoying the benefit of the 
product, UAV technology has the potential to dismantle the legal landscape set 
forth under Pennsylvania case law. The technological capabilities of UAVs allow 
                                                          
144 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 410. 
145 Id. at 375. 
146 Id. at 389 (citing Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d at 456). 
147 Barker, 573 P.2d at 457. 
148 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 409–10. 
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the devices to fly miles away from the UAV’s operator or intended user, in which 
countless people may observe the aircraft fly overhead, capture photos, blow 
bubbles, or perform tricks; this large audience may passively enjoy the benefits of 
the UAV. The product at issue is no longer piping in a house that will be solely 
enjoyed by one family; the scope of who may passively enjoy the benefit of a UAV 
is growing exponentially with the advancements in the field of autonomous robotic 
technology. 
For the entirety of the 50-year history of strict products liability law in the 
Commonwealth, consumer safety has been both an underlying and hovering 
dynamic factor. Although Berrier proceeded with the ideals of fairness in 
predicting the adoption of the Restatement (Third) in order to explicitly provide for 
bystander recovery, Tincher’s denial of the treatise reinforced Pennsylvania’s 
capricious injustice to injured innocent bystanders. 
Society will witness purely autonomous products in the marketplace during 
this lifetime, and these autonomous devices inherently expand the link between the 
users and the products themselves. The element of human control existed at the 
beginning of products liability law, since individuals created the products, sold and 
distributed the products, and ultimately used the products. The concept and 
viability of autonomy removes this element of human control from the product, 
which is the element that has persisted throughout the history of this doctrine. 
Autonomy will continue to stretch the element of human control further as 
technology advances to artificial intelligence. The doctrine of strict liability 
illuminates the heightened interest of consumer safety;150 this will be the essential 
steppingstone for future generations in crafting laws and regulations to adapt and 
keep abreast of quickly advancing products. Pennsylvania is a state driven by 
principles, not evidentiary concerns,151 and while considerations of use may be 
vitiated, the policy behind protecting the public is unwavering. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Major cavities exist in Pennsylvania’s products liability law following 
Tincher.152 UAVs and other autonomous robots are becoming commonplace in our 
everyday lives. The zone of danger for bystanders is being widened as a result of 
the sheer nature and capabilities of this new technology. There is a potential need 
for heightened public policy concerns now that consumers are no longer dealing 
                                                          
150 Id. at 383. 
151 Id. at 398. 
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with a product that affects one family; like the beer keg in Webb,153 coating 
machine in Azzarello,154 lighter in Phillips,155 bulk feed trailer in Riley,156 
lawnmower in Berrier,157 and pipes in Tincher.158 The very real threat of rogue 
UAVs should move the legislature and judiciary to take the potential of bystander 
injuries resulting from UAVs into consideration. Because quickly advancing 
technology ensures that passive enjoyment will be farther-reaching than ever 
before, it may be necessary for the courts to carve out an exception for bystanders 
specifically harmed by UAVs, considering bystanders are likely to be injured by 
the devices. Another alternative may be amending the definition of a “user” in 
Pennsylvania to encompass parties susceptible to injury by UAVs. Future 
legislation and decisions must be made with public policy interests in mind. The 
most eloquent statement of the indelible public policy interest driving strict liability 
in Pennsylvania was stated in Azzarello: 
The realities of our economic society as it exists today 
forces the conclusion that the risk of loss for injury 
resulting from defective products should be borne by the 
suppliers, principally because they are in a position to 
absorb the loss by distributing it as a cost of doing 
business. In an era of giant corporate structures, utilizing 
the national media to sell their wares, the original 
concern for an emerging manufacturing industry has 
given way to the view that it is now the consumer who 
must be protected. Courts have increasingly adopted the 
position that the risk of loss must be placed upon the 
supplier of the defective product without regard to fault 
or privity of contract.159 
Although that opinion is no longer authoritative, the palpable public policy backing 
strict products liability survives. 
                                                          
153 Webb, 220 A.2d at 854. 
154 Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1022. 
155 Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1002. 
156 Riley, 688 A.2d at 223. 
157 Berrier, 563 F.3d at 42. 
158 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 336. 
159 Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1023–24. 
